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The European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are two 
major players in post-Cold War crisis management. With dissimilar strengths and 
weaknesses and a somewhat different focus, the two organizations tackle conflicts 
and crises around the world. Based on insights from expert interviews with EU and 
NATO officials, the following questions are addressed: How effective has EU-NATO 
cooperation in crisis management been so far, and how will or should EU-NATO 
relations develop in the future? In recent years, the cooperation between these two 
largely overlapping institutions has become difficult and was at times blocked. I 
argue that effective EU-NATO cooperation is obstructed by differences at the very 
top. Quarrels between NATO member Turkey and EU member Cyprus limit the scope 
of political dialogue. The resulting lack of consultation and coordination impedes 
cooperation at the military-strategic and operational levels and entails the risk of 
unnecessary duplication in capability development. The presentation and analysis of 
five future scenarios for EU-NATO cooperation leads to the conclusion that the EU 
should develop an independent Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), 
capable of providing security and stability in the region and of performing the whole 
spectrum of the Petersberg tasks, including high-intensity conflicts. A strengthened 
CSDP would benefit NATO in terms of additional European capabilities and the US 
with regard to increased burden sharing. However, it certainly will take some time 
until this vision materializes. Meanwhile, the EU and NATO should gradually increase 
the efficiency of what resembles an ad hoc division of labor in crisis management. 
 




"NATO continues to be attractive. […] However, it is no longer the primary venue 
where transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate strategies."1 These were the 
words Gerhard Schröder bluntly pronounced at the Munich Security Conference in 
2005. Two years later, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, then Secretary General of NATO, 
referred to the relations between NATO and the European Union as a "frozen 
conflict".2 David Keohane even went so far as to describe the EU-NATO relationship 
as a "civil war".3   
 
W h a t  h a p p e n e d ?  O n c e  u p o n  a  t i m e ,  N A T O  u s e d  t o  b e  t h e  o v e r a r c h i n g  s e c u r i ty  
umbrella protecting the Europeans from the Soviet Union. Since the end of the Cold 
War, the security environment has dramatically changed. The Soviet threat is gone 
and an increasing number of diffuse, inter-linked and ever more complex security 
challenges have come to the fore. Europeans soon realized that the focus of US 
security policy was moving away from the Old Continent, and reacted by creating 
their own security toolbox, the Common Security and Defense Policy.4 This does not 
mean that the EU has grown away from NATO and from its transatlantic Allies. With 
21 common members the overlap between the two organizations is bigger than 
ever. The security threats and challenges the EU and NATO have identified are 
strikingly similar. Policymakers and diplomats have repeatedly underlined the 
importance of the 'strategic partnership' between the EU and NATO and emphasized 
their mutual interdependency.5  
 
The topic of EU-NATO cooperation in crisis management has received increased 
attention in the recent past. The Americans, first skeptical of the EU's new security 
policy, have now fully embraced it and are asking for more rather than less CSDP. 
After more than four decades, the traditional Euro-centric nation France has in 2009 
given up its ambiguous position towards NATO and reintegrated into its military 
                                                 
1 G. Schröder, former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, speech, 41th Munich 
Conference on Security Policy, Munich, 2 December 2005.  
2 J. de Hoop Scheffer, "NATO and the EU: Time for a New Chapter", Berlin, 29 January 2007.   
3 D. Keohane, "The Roadmap to Better EU-NATO Relations", CER Briefing Note, London, Centre 
for European Reform, 2007, p. 7.  
4 Since the former European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has been renamed 
Common Security and Defence Policy with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the latter 
term shall be used henceforth.  
5 For example: de Hoop Scheffer, "NATO and the EU", op.  cit. EU Diplomacy Papers 11/2010 
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command structure. In November 2010, the Alliance is presenting its New Strategic 
Concept. Furthermore, the transatlantic partners are engaged in Afghanistan, in a 
theatre that has been labeled a 'litmus test' for the world's most powerful military 
Alliance.   
 
But how effective6 has EU-NATO cooperation in crisis management been? What are 
the main obstacles to effective EU-NATO cooperation, and what implications for the 
future development of EU-NATO cooperation can be derived? I argue that effective 
EU-NATO cooperation has been obstructed by a Turkish-Cypriot double veto. 
Although blockades at the highest level are eventually circumvented through 
informal channels as well as at the operational level, the absence of formal decisions 
makes cooperation at all levels a complicated affair. While differences at the 
political level are often circumvented through informal channels and in the field, the 
full potential of cooperation remains unused. The strategic partnership is in need of a 
re-definition. I will present five future scenarios and evaluate them on the basis of 
three criteria: acceptability, realizability and sustainability. The analysis will show that 
none of these scenarios is likely to materialize in the foreseeable future.  
 
Yet, the world is moving fast and the challenges of the 21st century do not leave 
much time for two major institutions to work out how they should relate to each 
other.7 The EU and NATO will thus have to 'muddle through' and find creative 
solutions for practical cooperation.   
 
First, I will depict NATO and the EU in terms of overlapping role concepts and discuss 
notions of complementarity and competition. Second, I will provide an analysis of 
past and current EU-NATO cooperation that will differentiate between the political, 
military-strategic and operational levels. Third, I will present and evaluate five future 
scenarios. Finally, I will close with a short synthesis and present some policy 
recommendations. 
 
                                                 
6 In this paper, effectiveness is seen as a continuous variable. Institutional cooperation can 
range from completely ineffectual to highly effective arrangements, "which produce quick 
and decisive solutions to the problems at hand" (O.R. Young (ed.), The Effectiveness of 
International Environmental Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioral Mechanisms, 
Boston, MIT Press, 1999, p. 2). Effective EU-NATO cooperation means that the organizations 
deliver a quick, decisive and appropriate response to shared security challenges.  
7 de Hoop Scheffer, "NATO and the EU", op. cit. Nicole Koenig 
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2.  Overlapping Role Concepts  
 
During the Cold War, the EU and NATO represented two distinct forms of power. 
NATO was an organization created to project military power vis-à-vis the single most 
important threat, the Soviet Union. The then European Communities became known 
as a civilian power, a concept that was constructed around its economic strength 
and the absence of military instruments at the supranational level. After the Cold 
War, the EU and NATO both moved beyond their traditional roles. Parallel 
transformation as well as subsequent enlargement rounds resulted in an institutional 
and functional overlap. The question is: does this overlap entail complementarity or 
competition?  
 
2.1  NATO: A Military Alliance with a Comprehensive Approach  
2.1.1  Military Alliance in Transformation 
When the Soviet Union collapsed and the bilateral threat scenario came to an end, 
NATO faced a dual challenge: it lost its initial 'raison d'être' and was confronted with 
a new security environment characterized by complex and diffuse risks and 
challenges.8 As a result, "analysts in Europe and the United States have confidently 
predicted NATO's destiny of irrelevancy, if not total collapse".9 
 
Faced with this existential threat, NATO transformed and moved towards a more 
global role. As part of this transformation, NATO has opened its doors to twelve full 
new members from the former Soviet bloc. It has enlarged the group of global 
partners and engaged in closer cooperation and security dialogue with a large 
number of countries on four continents.10 During the last two decades, there has 
been a shift from collective defense and deterrence towards crisis management 
and humanitarian assistance. NATO's geographic scope has broadened and its 
focus has moved away from the European continent. In order to adapt to the new 
types of operations, NATO transformed its command structure and capabilities. At 
the Prague Summit in 2002, the Allies agreed on the 'Prague Capabilities Commit-
                                                 
8 M. de Haas (ed.), "From taking stock to increased European defense cooperation", 
Clingendael Discussion Paper, The Hague, Clingendael, 2007, p. 18.  
9 R.C. Hendrickson, "The Miscalculation of NATO's Death", Parameters, spring 2007, p. 98. 
10 V. Nuland, speech, London School of Economics, London, 2 February 2008.  EU Diplomacy Papers 11/2010 
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ment', reformed and streamlined the command structure and created a new rapid 
reaction mechanism, the NATO Response Force (NRF).  
 
2.1.2  NATO's Civilian Capabilities Gap 
The conflicts in the Balkans, in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that "the usefulness 
of military power alone has serious limits".11 In order to guarantee effective crisis 
management in the long term, civilian instruments like police forces, judges or civil 
administrators are of crucial importance. The Allies identified the importance of 
civilian security instruments very early in NATO's history. In 1956, the Report of the 
Three Wise Men on Non-Military Cooperation stated: "Security today is far more than 
a military matter."12 After the end of the Cold War, NATO underlined the importance 
of civilian instruments in responding to the changing security environment in its 
Strategic Concepts of 1991 and 1999.13  
 
NATO has been seeking to enhance the integration of civilian instruments through 
civil emergency planning, i.e. the coordination of the Allies' national planning 
activities. However, civilian planning and assets strictly remain under national control 
and there are often problems of internal coordination between the respective 
national ministries. National stabilization and reconstruction capabilities are rarely 
"organized into deployable assets that can provide cohesive, effective response 
options"14 and often assembled in an ad hoc manner.15 In places like Afghanistan, 
the lack of civilian capabilities forced NATO troops to take over civilian tasks. This is 
problematic since it can lead to a perceived militarization of civilian instruments.16  
 
2.1.3  NATO's Comprehensive Approach  
The Alliance was thus faced with a dilemma: on one hand, it acknowledged the 
importance of the civilian dimension in crisis management; on the other hand, the 
                                                 
11 J. Howorth, The Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007, p. 93. 
12 NATO, Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO, Brussels, 13 
September 1956.  
13 NATO, New Strategic Concept, Rome, 7/8 November 1991; NATO, Strategic Concept, 
Washington D.C., 23/24 April 1999. 
14 H. Binnendijk & R. Kugler, "Needed – A NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force", 
Defense Horizons, no. 45, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National 
Defense University, 2004, p. 1. 
15 Ibid.  
16 J. Shea, "NATO's Future and NATO-EU Relations: Are We Condemned to Be Eternal Rivals?", 
College of Europe (compact seminar), Bruges, 27 February 2009.  Nicole Koenig 
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possibility of acquiring its own civilian means had been ruled out.17 This dilemma 
gave birth to the Comprehensive Approach Initiative formally put on the agenda at 
the Riga Summit. The goal of the initiative was to define a reference frame or 
codification of existing practices for NATO's cooperation with other actors and their 
civilian crisis management instruments.18 The main idea was that NATO needed to 
improve civil-military cooperation with partners, international organizations, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and international organizations, in particular 
with the EU and the United Nations (UN).19 The 2010 Report of the Group of Experts on 
NATO's New Strategic Concept reiterated the importance of the comprehensive 
approach and stated: "NATO efforts to operate with civilian partners remain 
disjointed".20 The effective implementation of the comprehensive approach in 
peace operations like the ones in Afghanistan and Kosovo is an essential part of the 
current transatlantic debate "and will set the tone for future cooperation between 
the United States and Europe".21 
 
2.2  The EU: A Civilian Power with an Emerging Military Arm 
2.2.1 Civilian  Power  Europe 
The concept of 'civilian power' was first introduced by François Duchêne and 
represented one of the earliest and most influential attempts to conceptualize the 
European Community's role in international affairs. According to Duchêne, the 
nuclear stalemate devalued pure military power and gave more weight to "civilian 
forms of influence and action".22 These include diplomatic, economic and cultural 
policy instruments, for example, "the Single Market, humanitarian relief and the single 
currency, not to mention enlargement".23 The integration and enlargement 
processes were seen as the most prominent examples of the EU's 'civilizing' influence. 
                                                 
17 de Hoop Scheffer, "NATO and the EU", op. cit.   
18 F.A. Petersen & H. Binnendijk, "The Comprehensive Approach Initiative: Future Options for 
NATO",  Defense Horizons, no. 58, National Defense University, Center for Technology and 
National Security Policy, 2007, pp. 1-3. 
19 North Atlantic Council, Comprehensive Political Guidance, Brussels, 29 November 2006. 
20 NATO, NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement - Analysis and Recommen-
dation of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO, Brussels, 17 May 2010, 
pp. 41-42. 
21 Petersen & Binnendijk, op. cit., p. 2. 
22 F. Duchêne, "The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence", in M. 
Kohnstamm & W. Hager (eds.), A Nation Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems before the 
European Community, London, Macmillan, 1973, p. 43. 
23 A. Treacher, "From Civilian Power to Military Actor: The EU's Resistable Transformation", 
European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 9, no. 1, 2004, p. 51.  EU Diplomacy Papers 11/2010 
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Meanwhile, the Union's economic weight enabled it to influence third countries 
through political and economic conditionality.24  
 
When the Cold War ended, the concept of civilian power had a renaissance. A 
number of academics argued that the exercise of power in international relations 
ceased to depend on military means and that forms of 'soft power' would prevail.25 
With this changed definition of power, the EU was to play a crucial role in providing 
non-military instruments and in promoting awareness with regard to civilian aspects 
of security.26  
 
2.2.2  Civilian Power Shows Teeth  
The conflicts during and after the dissolution of former Yugoslavia painfully showed 
the limitations of civilian power. Once again, the EU had to rely on its Alliance 
partners in order to resolve a crisis in its own backyard. At the bilateral summit in St. 
Malo in 1998, France and the United Kingdom drew their conclusions from the 
experience in the Balkans and laid the foundations of the European Security and 
Defence Policy. The St. Malo Declaration insisted that "the Union must have the 
capacity of autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to 
decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international 
crises".27   
 
In the following years, the institutional, capability-related and strategic foundations of 
the ESDP were put in place. On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted 
the European Security Strategy (ESS). In its first strategy document, the Union stated it 
was "inevitably a global player",28 and emphasized the importance of a 
comprehend-sive and preventive approach to crisis management.29 The Lisbon 
Treaty in 2009 re-baptized the ESDP to CSDP and introduced Permanent Structured 
Cooperation (art. 46 TEU), a mechanism allowing willing member states to enhance 
military integration among them but within an EU framework. The Lisbon Treaty also 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 
25 For example: J.S. Nye, Jr., "Soft Power", Foreign Policy, vol. 80, 1990, pp. 153-171. 
26 S. Duke, The New European Security Disorder, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 1994, p. 
228.  
27 Franco-British Summit Declaration, Joint Declaration on European Defence, St. Malo, 4 
December 1998.  
28 European Council, A Secure Europe In A Better World - European Security Strategy, Brussels, 
12 December 2003, p. 1.  
29 Ibid., p. 11. Nicole Koenig 
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introduced a Solidarity Clause (art. 222 TFEU) and a Mutual Defence Clause (art. 42 
(7) TEU).  
 
2.2.3  The EU’s Military Capabilities Gap 
Taken as a bloc, the EU is the world's most important military power after the US. It has 
over 2 million men and women in uniform and a combined defense budget of over € 
200 billion.30 Since 2003, the EU has launched seven military CSDP missions. Though 
these figures sound impressive, they are misleading. In fact, only around 5% of the 
EU's 2 million troops are currently deployable in out-of-area operations.31 Taken 
together, European military spending does not even amount to half of the US 
defense expenditures. In addition, intra-European duplication and fragmentation 
lead to very low overall cost-effectiveness.32  
 
The EU can hardly be called a global military power. Nevertheless, the development 
of the CSDP has raised questions concerning the EU's status as a civilian power. 
According to a NATO official, the concept of civilian power is outdated:  
It was used in order to show that the EU is a counter-weight to the US, that the EU 
shows the positive example of how to shape the world without military. But de 
facto the EU is striving to grow out of the civilian power and to become a military 
one. Japan and Germany were often cited as examples of civilian power, but 
they were only successful because somebody else protected them.33 
 
Today, the main question is how to connect civilian and military instruments in order 
to project 'comprehensive power'. If the EU wants to implement the comprehensive 
a p p r o a c h  o u t l i n e d  i n  t h e  E S S ,  i t  n e e d s  t o  b e  a b l e  t o  c o m p l e m e n t  i t s  c i v i l i a n  
instruments with military ones. While it has acquired civil-military institutions and 
expertise, it is still dependent on other actors when it comes to high-intensity 
conflicts.34   
                                                 
30 S. Biscop, "The Ambiguous Ambition: The Development of the EU Security Architecture", 
paper presented at the colloquium The EC/EU: A World Security Actor?, Paris, EU Institute for 
Security Studies, 15 September 2006, p. 1.  
31 A. Toje, "The EU, NATO and European Defence – A Slow Train Coming", Occasional Paper, 
no. 74, Paris, European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2008, p. 26.  
32 Biscop, "The Ambiguous Ambition", op. cit., p. 3.  
33 Interview with NATO official B, International Staff, Brussels, 24 March 2009. 
34 N. Pirozzi & S. Sandawi, "Five Years of ESDP in Action: Operations, Trends, Shortfalls", 
European Security Review, no. 39, 2008, p. 2. EU Diplomacy Papers 11/2010 
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2.3  The EU and NATO – Between Complementarity and Competition  
"There is no stronger civil player than the European Union. And there is no stronger 
military alliance than NATO."35 Both organizations face the challenge of integrating 
civilian and military instruments through a comprehensive approach, and of ensuring 
adequate procure-ment for crisis management. While NATO lacks civilian 
capabilities in places like Afghanistan, the EU is not able to address high-intensity 
conflicts autonomously. The obvious conclusion would be that the EU and NATO are 
complementary.  
 
However, the EU-NATO relationship has often been viewed as a zero-sum game. 
Euro-centric nations like France portrayed the EU as a competitor of the US, 
potentially able to rival its power and influence. Altanticist countries like the UK 
feared that the CSDP would undermine NATO and thus the transatlantic link. US 
policymakers observed the development of the EU's military arm with skepticism and 
underlined that the US did not want a CSDP "that comes into being first within NATO 
but then grows out of NATO and finally grows away from NATO".36 These political 
dividing lines within the EU and across the Atlantic have often given rise to tensions.  
 
Furthermore, EU-NATO relations are marked by inter-institutional competition. 
According to a NATO official,  
The EU always considers itself a superior organization because it is built around the 
integrationist project. In NATO, there is just coordination and no integration. Some 
people in the bureaucracy of the EU do not accept the notion that NATO could 
be of equal weight. […] The EU is seeing itself as the future and NATO is often seen 
as the past.37 
 
Finally, there is a potential for competition and duplication when it comes to 
capabilities. While both organizations are struggling to improve and increase the 
military capabilities of their member states, the respective capability goals set slightly 
different priorities. Considering that nations only have one set of forces and 
                                                 
35 de Hoop Scheffer, "NATO and the EU", op. cit. 
36 quoted in P. Hughes, "NATO and the EU: Managing the Frozen Conflict: Test Case 
Afghanistan", ZEI Discussion Paper, C178, Bonn, Center for European Integration Studies, 2007, 
p. 7. 
37 Interview with NATO official B, op. cit. Nicole Koenig 
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taxpayers, and that the Europeans face difficulties in meeting their requirements on 
either side, setting different priorities does not make much sense.38  
 
The institutional overlaps between the EU and NATO as well as the mirror-inverted 
capability gaps create an important potential for cooperation. However, rivalling 
visions for the future, political dividing lines and inter-institutional differences might 
provoke competition. The EU-NATO relationship thus seems to be both complemen-
tary and competitive in nature.  
  
3.  Cooperation in Crisis Management: Rules of Engagement and 
Implementation 
 
In the course of the years, the EU and NATO increasingly overlapped in terms of 
m e m b e r s h i p ,  c o m p e t e n c e  a n d  a m b i t i o n s .  I t  s o o n  b e c a m e  a p p a r e n t  t h a t  a n  
institutional link was needed in order to manage this overlap. This link was the 'Berlin 
Plus Agreement'. The question is how effective this institutional link was in guiding the 
cooperation between the two organizations and whether it still corresponds to the 
realities of today's EU-NATO interactions in crisis management. 
 
3.1  Rules of Engagement 
The political principles of the EU-NATO 'strategic partnership' in crisis management 
were set out in the 2002 NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP.39 While acknowledging the 
different nature of the organizations, the declaration underlined the importance of 
mutual consultation, cooperation, transparency, and of the mutually reinforcing 
development of military capability requirements. It welcomed the EU's capacity to 
conduct crisis management operations, "including military operations where NATO as 
a whole is not engaged".40 
 
On 17 March 2003, the 'Berlin Plus Agreement' was concluded. The agreement 
constitutes the foundation of practical EU-NATO cooperation in crisis management. It 
sets out the terms of reference and procedures permitting the EU to conduct crisis 
management operations with recourse to NATO's assets, capabilities and planning 
facilities. Furthermore, it regulates the release of confidential information, restricted to 
                                                 
38 Keohane, op. cit., p. 6.  
39 EU-NATO, Declaration on ESDP, Brussels, 16 December 2002. 
40 Ibid. EU Diplomacy Papers 11/2010 
  13
nations that have a security agreement with the respective organization and 
establishes arrangements for cooperation in the field of capability development.41  
 
3.2  Cooperation at the Political Level  
3.2.1 Formal  Meetings 
The formal venues for political dialogue are the meetings between the Political and 
Security Committee (PSC) and the North Atlantic Council (NAC). In the beginning, a 
broad range of issues was discussed in these meetings. Non-allied EU members, like 
Finland, Austria, Ireland and Sweden attended the meetings and the exchange of 
documents was unproblematic since each of them had concluded security 
agreements with the Alliance in the context of NATO's Partnership for Peace 
program.42   
 
Problems arose when Malta and Cyprus, that were not members of the Partnership 
for Peace Program, joined the EU in 2004. Due to the fraught political relations 
between Cyprus and Turkey, the latter blocked the sharing of NATO security 
information with both of the new EU member states and refused to discuss matters of 
'strategic cooperation' in their presence. Cyprus in turn rejected any discussions 
beyond the 'Berlin Plus' operations, when it and Malta were absent. As a result, NAC-
PSC meetings take place without Cyprus43 and formal discussions are limited to joint 
EU-NATO missions, of which there is currently only one, operation Althea. Other issues 
of mutual concern like Kosovo, Afghanistan, terrorism or piracy are not on the 
agenda. Even routine cooperation between the EU and NATO, including the 
exchange of documents or joint crisis-management exercises, has become very 
complicated.44  
 
                                                 
41 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Berlin Plus Agreement, 2006.  
42 S. Hofmann & C. Reynolds, "EU-NATO Relations: Time to Thaw the 'Frozen Conflict'", SWP 
Comments, no. 12, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2007, p. 3.  
43 Malta has joined the Partnership for Peace program in 2008. Currently, Turkey allows Malta 
to receive NATO information and to participate in some of the planning meetings (interview 
with NATO official B, op. cit.).   
44 Hofmann & Reynolds, op. cit., p. 4.  Nicole Koenig 
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3.2.2 Informal  Meetings 
In order to circumvent the restrictions and blockades at the highest level, informal 
channels of dialogue between the EU and NATO have emerged. Though 
infrequently, informal meetings take place in one of three constellations: 
-  NAC-PSC meetings 
-  EU-NATO Military Committee meetings 
-  EU-NATO Foreign Ministerial meetings/Transatlantic Dinners45 
 
Informal meetings are scheduled ad hoc and occur behind closed doors. There are 
no pre-determined agendas, no minutes and no press releases. Turkey and Cyprus 
can thus attend these meetings without (formally) acknowledging it.46 The 
advantage of informal meetings is that a broad range of issues of mutual interest 
can be discussed. They can prepare the ground for future formal discussions and 
lead to the development of a common strategic perspective. According to Jamie 
Shea, this is the case for Afghanistan:47 the EU and NATO meet informally and 
develop a common strategic vision. They then go back to their respective structures 
and implement this vision parallel to each other. This approach has, for instance, led 
to the EU's proposal to send an Election Observation Mission to Afghanistan for the 
Presidential and Provincial Council Elections on 20 August 2009.48 
 
However, there are clear limits to informal cooperation. First, it can also be 
obstructed by single member states. In the past, France has often blocked progress, 
arguing that the issues at stake were too important to be discussed in informal 
meetings. Second, without formal meetings there cannot be any formal decisions, 
which are often necessary for strategic and operational coordination.49 For instance, 
in order to ensure the protection of the EU's civilian staff by NATO troops, a formal 
security agreement is needed. In the cases of Kosovo and Afghanistan, Turkey 
blocked such agreements and the protection of the EU's civilian staff depended on 
Turkey's willingness to turn a blind eye on bilateral security agreements.  
 
                                                 
45 Ibid., p. 5.  
46 Ibid., p. 4.  
47 Interview with J. Shea, Director of Policy Planning in the Private Office of the Secretary 
General at NATO Headquarters, 24 March 2009. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Hofmann & Reynolds, loc. cit. EU Diplomacy Papers 11/2010 
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3.3  Cooperation at the Military-Strategic Level  
Military-strategic cooperation is also (formally) restricted to 'Berlin Plus' operations. In 
order to facilitate cooperation and mutual information flows in planning, the NATO 
Liaison Team at the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and the EU Cell at the Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Power Europe (SHAPE) have been established in 2005. Within the 
agreed framework, cooperation is said to work "smoothly and evenly".50 However, 
when meetings of the military committees i n  e i t h e r  o r g a n i z a t i o n  g o  b e y o n d  t h e  
agreed framework (i.e. operation Althea), the respective liaison officers have to 
leave the room. At the military-strategic level, the mutual release of documents has 
also been obstructed by political blockades.51  
 
These blockades are – once again – circumvented through informal channels. While 
both organizations have a very strong protocol on document release, Michael 
Kennedy, Head of the EU Cell at SHAPE, cautiously stated: "The general contents of 
documents may sometimes be released for reasons of practical cooperation."52 
Informally, issues like Kosovo and Afghanistan are discussed on a weekly basis. 
However, informal discussions cannot provide the strategic guidance and the 
delineation of tasks that troops and civilian staff need on the ground.53  
 
3.4  Cooperation on the Ground  
3.4.1 'Berlin  Plus'  Operations 
Until now, two CSDP operations have been conducted under the 'Berlin Plus' 
framework: operation Concordia that took over the responsibilities of the NATO-led 
operation Allied Harmony in FYROM (31 March 2003-15 December 2003), and the 
ongoing operation Althea that took over the responsibilities of the NATO-led 
Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) on 2 December 2004.  
 
The operational cooperation between the EU and NATO in the framework of the 
'Berlin Plus' operations was hampered whenever the quarrels at the political-
institutional level impacted on the operational level. Ahead of operation Concordia, 
Turkish-Greek differences prolonged the negotiations on the 'Berlin Plus' Agreement 
                                                 
50 Interview with LtCol M. Kennedy, Head of the EU Cell at SHAPE, Brussels, 21 April 2009.  
51 For more details, see: Hofmann & Reynolds, loc. cit.  
52 Interview with LtCol Kennedy, op. cit.  
53 Ibid. Nicole Koenig 
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and thus postponed the European takeover.54 Ahead of operation Althea, 
negotiations were stretched since the US did not have enough confidence in the 
military muscle of the young ESDP. In reaction to the EU accession of Cyprus and 
Malta, Turkey prevented any meeting of EU and NATO military committees 
throughout the period of September 2004 to March 2005.55    
 
The problems at the political and military-strategic levels led to an unclear 
delineation of responsibilities between the EU and NATO on the ground. The 
declared aim of operation Concordia was to provide a safe environment in FYROM. 
This mandate overlapped with NATO's remaining consultant mission that was 
responsible for border control.56 In BiH, the problems were similar: both the EU and 
NATO were, among other things, charged with assisting the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the capture of indicted war criminals.57 Finally, 
shortfalls in cooperation cannot even be processed in EU-NATO lessons-learned 
documents: any conclusion that implies 'victory' for one or the other organization 
must be left out or watered down.58   
 
Despite these obstacles, NATO and EU officials asserted that the operational 
cooperation within the framework of the 'Berlin Plus Agreement' worked very well.59 
The reason is that problems at the political or military-strategic levels were often 
resolved on the ground. In BiH, for instance, NATO and EU force commanders were 
charged with disentangling the respective mandates. After a satisfactory solution 
had been found at the operational level, it was formalized by an exchange of letters 
and endorsed by both the EU's General Affairs and External Relations Council and 
the NAC.60  
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59 Interviews with EU and NATO officials.  
60 Hofmann & Reynolds, loc. cit. EU Diplomacy Papers 11/2010 
  17
3.4.2  Cooperation beyond 'Berlin Plus'  
The 'Berlin Plus Agreement' was designed for situations where the EU takes over 
responsibility from NATO. But this is only one possibility out of a broad spectrum of EU-
NATO interactions in crisis management. Contrary to assumptions in the 1990s, the EU 
and NATO are and have been engaged side by side in several countries. 
 
The case of parallel NATO-EU engagement that currently draws most attention is 
certainly Afghanistan. NATO has been on the ground since 2003, when it took over 
the command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Since then, the 
Alliance has been expanding the outreach of the mission and has increased the 
number of troops from an initial strength of 5.000 to approximately 120.000 troops 
from 46 countries in 2010.61 In 2007, NATO as well as Afghans, NGOs, and an array of 
international actors on the ground called for an increase in the EU's civilian presence. 
The EU responded to these calls by launching the police mission EUPOL Afghanistan 
on 15 June 2007.  
 
While both the EU and NATO have underlined the importance of a comprehensive 
approach for Afghanistan, the CSDP contribution was rather meager. EUPOL's initial 
mandate provided for 160 civilian staff, representing roughly one-tenth the size of the 
contingent deployed to Kosovo. In May 2008, the Council decided to increase the 
number of civilian personnel to 40062, but only 265 international experts were on the 
ground by June 2010.63  
 
While the EU is unable or unwilling to live up to its 'soft power potential' and to 
provide civilian staff, the US is doing 95% of the police work.64 In 2009, NATO 
established a training mission in Afghanistan in order to reinforce the development of 
professional training for the Afghan police.65 Whether this will lead to a duplication of 
efforts or "greater synergy"66 between the EU and NATO, as called for by NATO 
Secretary General Rasmussen in April 2010, remains to be seen. 
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Although EU-NATO (or EU-US) differences with regard to Afghanistan are too complex 
to outline in this paper, it is clear to all sides that "stability in Afghanistan will not come 
through military means alone".67 Afghanistan is thus not only a major test for the 
Alliance, but also for the credibility of the EU as a civilian actor in crisis management. 
In the end, Afghanistan will show whether the EU and NATO are able to cooperate in 
synergy in order to "advance the security interests of the West".68   
 
3.5 Capability  Development 
In 2003, the EU-NATO Capability Group was created with the goal to prevent 
duplication and to ensure mutually reinforcing efforts in the area of capability 
development. The Group focuses on initiatives such as the EU Battlegroups and the 
NRF as well as on areas where the EU and NATO face similar capabilities gaps.  
 
Though the Group has increased transparency and is a platform for inter-
organizational information exchange,69 the cooperation fails to go beyond that. 
When NATO and EU capability experts meet, they present their concepts and results. 
Analysis as well as planning is done separately. The meetings of the EU-NATO 
Capability Group are generally scheduled ad hoc and are often cancelled. 
Meanwhile, the European Defense Agency (EDA) has still not been able to establish 
formal contact with the Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk.70 
 
In the field of capability development, NATO expects more burden sharing from the 
EU. More division of labor is needed in the areas of protection against improvised 
explosive devices, protection of vehicles, jamming devices, drones, and the 
upgrading of helicopters to make them deployable in Afghanistan. There are 
approximately 4000 helicopters in Europe, but only few are fully equipped and 
deployable outside of national territory.71  
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3.5.1  The Future of 'Berlin Plus' 
As the example of parallel engagement has shown, 'Berlin Plus' has not become the 
institutional link it was envisioned to be. The scheme 'NATO first – then the EU comes 
in', a model based on the experience of the Balkans, is no longer valid. Today, only 
operation Althea corresponds to the institutional design of the 1990s. Due to the 
narrow interpretation of the 'Berlin Plus Agreement', the termination of operation 
Althea will put an end to formal NATO-EU dialogue.  
 
The more the EU and NATO moved beyond the Balkans, the more it became clear 
that a new agreement for EU-NATO cooperation was needed. One proposal was to 
establish a 'Berlin Plus Reverse', permitting NATO to formally request the deployment 
of EU civilian assets alongside its military operations. However, discussions on the 
establishment of 'Berlin Plus Reverse', or any other formal arrangement that would 
give NATO recourse to European civilian assets, have stalled due to political 
objections. Strong proponents of the CSDP are reluctant to cede the domain of civil-
military cooperation, where the EU has a comparative advantage, to NATO. 
Furthermore, some EU members like France fear that the CSDP will become a 
'toolbox' for US operations. They believe that the EU would lose its autonomy of 
decision in comprehensive interventions and that NATO's leadership would degrade 
the CSDP's role to the one of a "junior partner".72   
  
4.  Future Perspectives and Scenarios  
 
The prevailing opinion is that the transatlantic security partnership is in dire need of 
re-definition and that it is "time to thaw the 'frozen conflict'".73 What will this re-
definition look like? How will EU-NATO cooperation develop in the future? In order to 
approach these questions, five possible future scenarios will be presented.74 They will 
be analyzed according to the criteria of acceptability (political will and tolerability 
on both sides of the Atlantic), realizability (capacities) and sustainability (i.e. whether 
a scenario could be sustained in the long-term).75 I consider these interdependent 
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criteria decisive for a comparable assessment of the likelihood, potential success 
and stability of the future scenarios of EU-NATO cooperation. Without political will, it is 
unlikely for a scenario to materialize in the first place. Without capacities, a scenario 
is unlikely to yield effective responses to common security challenges. The 
assessment of the sustainability criterion yields a prognosis on the stability of a given 
form of EU-NATO cooperation, once the other two criteria are fulfilled.    
 
4.1  Back to the Bosom of Uncle Sam  
The EU could decide that it does not need two big 'elephants' in its backyard and 
that NATO should become the major security provider in Europe. The Union would in 
this case admit that its capabilities do not match its ambitions, revert to its original 
status as civilian power and return to the 'bosom of Uncle Sam' in security matters. 
 
However, the US is neither willing nor able to take over responsibility for European 
security. As mentioned earlier, there has been a paradigmatic shift in US views on the 
CSDP. While skepticism prevailed in the beginning, the CSDP is now seen as 
complementary to NATO. US policymakers see the CSDP as a vehicle for 
strengthening European military capabilities eventually leading to enhanced 
transatlantic burden sharing. This change in attitude was reflected by US 
ambassador Nuland's speech in Paris in 2008, in which she emphasized: "Europe 
needs, the United States needs, NATO needs, the democratic world needs – a 
stronger, more capable European defense capacity."76 This new trend in US foreign 
policy is pursued by the current administration. During a press conference at NATO's 
Strasbourg/Kehl Summit in 2009, president Barack Obama renewed calls for more 
robust European defense capabilities and emphasized that the US does not want to 
be Europe's "patron"77 but that it was looking for a strong partner.  
 
Atlanticist EU members like Poland, Czech Republic or the Baltic countries would be 
in favor of a stronger US role within NATO and on the European continent. This is 
mainly due to their threat perceptions vis-à-vis Russia and their conviction that the US 
is the only ally able to protect their 'hard security interests'. This does, however, not 
mean that they favor a weaker CSDP. In fact, strengthening the CSDP is on top of 
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the agenda of the upcoming Polish Presidency 2011.78 Documents like the ESS, the 
report on its implementation, and last but not least the Lisbon Treaty (art. 42-46 TEU), 
clearly reflect the common conviction that the EU should play a global role in 
security and further develop its military capabilities.  
 
In the end, both sides of the Atlantic would oppose a re-Americanization of NATO. 
Considering the over-stretch of the US military in Afghanistan and the growing 
pressure from the domestic war opposition79, it is also highly questionable whether 
such a scenario would be realizable. Thus, the necessary pre-conditions for the 
sustainability of this scenario are not met.  
 
4.2 Twin-Headed  Eagle 
The relationship between the EU and NATO might also develop into a 'twin-headed 
eagle'. In this scenario, the two organizations would tie their 'bodies' together while 
keeping their own 'heads'. They would share the same planning structure, and 
capabilities would be at the disposal of either organization.  
 
A 'twin-headed eagle' scenario implies that the EU and NATO have a common 
command and control structure. The two organizations could link the idea of a 
European headquarters with NATO and build a joint civil-military headquarters 
closely connected to SHAPE. While the British continue to oppose the idea of an 
autonomous European headquarters, such a proposal could satisfy them, especially 
if the DSACEUR stayed involved. For France, however, the headquarters question is a 
national priority. President Sarkozy must deliver a European headquarters if he wants 
to counter domestic criticism regarding France's reintegration. In addition, the French 
always disliked the idea to share the EU's comparative advantage in civil-military 
planning with NATO.  
 
Another political obstacle to the development of EU-NATO relations into a 'twin-
headed eagle' is the Turkish-Cypriot impasse .  I f  T u r k e y  b l o c k s  p r a g m a t i c  i s s u e s  o f  
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cooperation like security agreements to protect EU civilians, it is highly unlikely that 
any decision to combine structures would be waved through. The contentious issue is 
and will be Turkey's EU membership. The Europeans are divided on this issue and the 
odds for Turkish EU membership in the near future are quite low. So are the 
perspectives for Cypriot reunification. There is thus no solution to the Turkey-Cyprus 
issue in the foreseeable future.80  
 
Apart from these political obstacles, certain practical issues would render the 
implementation of a twin-headed eagle scenario difficult. There would be a need for 
strategic harmonization and increased interoperability between the EU and NATO. To 
name just one practical example: the two organizations have dissimilar approaches 
to planning. While NATO members commit forces to the Alliance, the EU approach is 
bottom-up and forces are contributed on a voluntary and ad hoc basis.  
 
If political and strategic obstacles could be surmounted, the twin-headed eagle 
scenario might be relatively sustainable. It generally takes long to change 
organizational structures once they are in place. The question is whether such a 
scenario would be desirable. Common structures would lead to less duplication and 
thus to a rationalization of defense efforts. Moreover, inter-organizational 
socialization and closer personnel ties would possibly lead to a convergence of 
strategic perspectives. On the other hand, the twin-headed eagle would leave little 
flexibility for either organization to pursue its respective security priorities 
autonomously. An autonomous CSDP has the advantage that it can deploy in 
places like Georgia81, Palestine or Lebanon, where a NATO (and especially US) 
presence would not be welcome or appropriate. If the EU and NATO merged their 
structures, CSDP missions might directly be associated with NATO and this advantage 
would be lost. 
 
                                                 
80 Interview with an official of the European Union Military Staff, Brussels, 23 April 2009. 
81 A military NATO deployment to Georgia would have been perceived as a return to the 
Cold War era. The deployment of an EU civilian mission, conducted without the US – 
Georgia's closest ally – was politically less contentious. EU Diplomacy Papers 11/2010 
  23
4.3 Two-Pillar  NATO 
Several scholars have predicted that NATO will develop into a two-pillar Alliance with 
the US on one side and the EU on the other.82 The Alliance would be re-balanced 
permitting increased burden sharing across the Atlantic. This would result in a flexible 
and pragmatic division of labor: based on a case-by-case assessment, the most 
suitable framework for engagement would be chosen. 
 
Europeans would have more leverage in the Alliance's decision-making process. Due 
to an increased burden sharing and division of labor, there would be a constant 
need for consultation with NATO. This would permit the EU to use the Alliance as a 
forum to restrain the US.83 This facet would assuage fears of NATO becoming a 
'toolbox' for US operations. 
 
While the transatlantic link and the collective defense clause would be kept intact, 
both the EU and NATO would dispose of the whole range of crisis management 
instruments.84 If an EU member state faced an imminent security threat, the 
Europeans would concert first and then decide with their allied partners on the 
operational framework. Such a vision might comfort the Eastern EU member states, 
since it would provide a 'double-insurance policy' in case of Russian aggression.  
 
For the US, the main advantage of a two-pillar NATO would be the aspect of 
increased burden sharing. The US could expect its equal partner in the Alliance to 
provide more resources for operations like ISAF and use NATO to demand more 
civilian CSDP contributions within the framework of NATO's Comprehensive 
Approach. 
 
A two-pillar NATO implies that there is a European caucus within NATO. Even if the 
Europeans wanted to be represented by a single seat in NATO, they would probably 
not be able to 'speak with a single voice'. The example of the Iraq war has shown 
that threat perceptions do not only diverge across the Atlantic but also within 
Europe. Depending on the political constellations and on the security challenge at 
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hand, EU member states might represent diametrically opposed viewpoints. 
According to Sven Biscop, the intra-European divide is the main obstacle to a truly 
balanced EU-US partnership.85  
  
Another obstacle to a two-pillar NATO and to true burden sharing is the EU's military 
capabilities gap. EU defense spending is on the decline, intra-European duplication 
and fragmentation persist and efforts to pool resources are advancing at a slow 
pace. The EU does not have its own headquarters and is thus limited in its ability to 
autonomously deploy larger-scale military operations. Furthermore, the CSDP is still 
facing a strategic void. While the ESS has stated ambitious goals, there is no civil-
military sub-strategy to complement it. Finally, there is no common vision on the level 
of military ambition that the EU as a whole wants to attain.86  
 
If the Europeans were able to 'speak with one voice' and to generate more 
capabilities, a two-pillar Alliance would probably not be sustainable in the long term. 
The US and other non-European Allies do not want to speak to a unified European 
bloc within NATO. "They prefer to talk to an organized EU in the EU and to a 
disorganized one in NATO".87 Once the EU-27 find a consensus, it is very hard to 
negotiate with them. Sooner or later, the US would probably use its power and 
instruments to divide the Europeans.88 This strategy became apparent during the Iraq 
crisis when former US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld exacerbated the intra-
European divide by his rhetoric about the "Old" and the "New Europe". Although the 
Obama Administration has a different foreign policy approach than the previous 
one, it cannot be ruled out that it will rely on 'coalitions of the willing' in the future. 
Bilateral cooperation between the US and single EU member states could easily draw 
a European pillar apart. 
 
4.4  The Dinner and the Dishes 
The EU and NATO could agree on a division of labor. NATO would be kept as an 
exclusively military organization ensuring collective defense and responding to 'hard' 
security threats, including territorial defense and high-intensity conflicts. The EU would 
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focus on lower-intensity conflicts and post-conflict reconstruction and specialize in 
'soft' security challenges such as energy and cyber security. The US could be invited 
to participate in CSDP missions and other threat responses on a case-by-case basis.   
 
Considering the transatlantic military capabilities gap, a functional division of labor 
between the EU and NATO essentially equals a 'soft-hard' division of labor between 
the EU and the US. This comes back to the famous notion of the US 'preparing the 
dinner' and the EU 'washing the dishes'. This simplistic approach is accepted on 
neither side of the Atlantic. The US would argue that it is doing the 'dirty job', while the 
EU takes credit for the rewarding part of post-conflict reconstruction. At the same 
time, Europeans do not want to be reduced to the clean-uppers or to a sort of 
"civilian agency"89 for NATO. They are also aware of the fact that post-conflict 
reconstruction is often more costly and time-consuming than the actual military 
intervention itself.  
 
The EU has unambiguously declared that it wanted to be a global player. The CSDP 
was designed to enable the EU to act across the whole spectrum of military 
operations. The objectives stated in the EU's military headline goals clearly indicate 
that the EU wants to be able to respond to high-intensity conflicts in the future. A 
formal 'soft-hard' division of labor would put an "artificial upper limit"90 on the EU's 
ambitions. 
 
Moreover, NATO's role would be reduced to high-intensity crisis management, 
collective and territorial defense. The Alliance would thus have to leave areas like 
energy or cyber security to the responsibility of the EU. Whether some of the Allies, 
especially the post-communist ones, would accept such a strict functional division of 
labor is questionable. Considering NATO's capacities in critical infrastructure 
protection, it is also doubtful whether such a reduction of NATO's role is desirable for 
the security of the transatlantic area.  
 
Though politically controversial, we currently have an informal 'soft-hard' division of 
labor in places like Afghanistan or Kosovo. According to Jamie Shea, the kind of 
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division of labor we are witnessing in Kosovo is a model for the future.91 In 
Afghanistan, the division of labor is rather asymmetric. The fact that the EU could 
hardly agree on deploying a total of 400 police to Afghanistan, while it sends around 
2.000 to the much smaller Kosovo, reflects a certain hierarchy of security interests. 
While the stabilization of the Balkans is of highest priority for the EU, there is no clear 
'CSDP focus' on Afghanistan.    
 
The sustainability of a division of labor approach depends on a transatlantic 
convergence in security priorities and on a common delineation of each 
organization's tasks. In order to foster a common approach and to agree on the 
terms of a division of labor, the EU and N A T O  w o u l d  ha v e  t o  en g a g e  i n  p o l i ti c a l 
dialogue. Since this political dialogue is not taking place, there is no common vision 
on the 'lay-out' of a division of labor, and tensions are likely to arise sooner or later.  
 
4.5  Back to the Future 
NATO's original purpose was to give the EU a frame to develop its own military 
instruments. However, the idea of a European Defense Community collapsed in 1954, 
and NATO became the predominant security actor in Europe. The EU could return to 
its original ambitions and strive for independence from the Alliance. The EU could 
maintain peace and stability on the continent and in its proximate neighborhood 
and engage in peacekeeping operations according to its priorities. NATO would 
remain in place as a community of values and a forum for political consultation. The 
collective defense clause would be kept intact, and NATO would remain the 
institutional lynchpin for a coordination of efforts and a delineation of tasks when 
there are common threat perceptions among the Allies.   
 
An independent CSDP has long been on the agenda of Europeanist nations like 
France. However, traditional Atlanticist nations like the UK, the Czech Republic and 
Poland still advocate a strong link between the CSDP and NATO and are wary of 
duplication and possible competition. Paradoxically, the US seems to be more willing 
to accept a more autonomous CSDP than some of the Atlanticist EU members. The 
attitude of US policymakers has become pragmatic. They want a strategic partner 
that can take over burden from the US and are aware that a certain degree of 
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duplication is unavoidable.92 If the US is serious about its calls for a stronger CSDP, it 
could rely on the European Atlanticists to accept the permanent European 
headquarters, which is arguably a necessary condition for a stronger and more 
independent CSDP.93 
 
While headquarters might give the EU more planning autonomy, it is not a sufficient 
condition for an independent CSDP. The main obstacle for increased autonomy is 
the lack of military capabilities. If the EU wants to be able to maintain peace and 
stability in the region and to provide real 'added value' in peacekeeping in complex 
theatres like the ones in Africa, it has to acquire the capacities to respond to high-
intensity conflicts. In the medium term, European governments are unlikely to 
substantially boost their military expenditures. In the long term, EDA plans for 
increased pooling and specialization as well as Permanent Structured Cooperation 
could gradually close the military capabilities gap.  
 
Former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer clearly encouraged the 
initiatives of the French Presidency to "develop more robust EU military capabilities in 
addition to strengthened planning structures".94 Since NATO largely draws on the 
same pool of forces as the CSDP, it suffers from the lack of European military 
capabilities. If an independent CSDP proves to be an engine for capabilities 
development, it will also make the Alliance more capable.      
 
In the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration, the Allies emphasized that the autonomy 
of the EU and NATO as security actors should be maintained.95 It is thus unlikely that 
the EU and NATO will, in the foreseeable future, strive to re-Americanize NATO or join 
their structures in order to become a twin-headed eagle. A two-pillar NATO with a 
single European seat is likely to be opposed by non-European Allies and requires an 
important boost of the EU's military capabilities. Although there is no formal 
agreement on a 'soft-hard' division of labor, the reality of the operations in 
Afghanistan or Kosovo comes quite close to this fourth scenario. While this kind of 
transatlantic burden sharing is likely to dominate the picture in the coming years, its 
sustainability is questionable. On several occasions, the US has already voiced 
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discontent about the asymmetric burden it is carrying in Afghanistan. Ideally, the EU 
would live up to the ambitions expressed in the ESS and develop an CSDP capable 
of securing its own neighborhood and of launching operations across the whole 
spectrum of the Petersberg tasks. NATO would remain as an insurance policy and 
would benefit from increased European capabilities for Alliance operations.   
 
5.  Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
This paper has analyzed how effective EU-NATO cooperation in crisis management 
has been so far, and how the EU and NATO will or should interact in order to cope 
with the changing security environment.  
 
I have argued that while the current political constellations attenuate the risk of inter-
institutional competition between the EU and NATO, obstacles to cooperation 
prevent the organizations from unleashing their potential for complementarity. 
Political dialogue stalled because Turkish-Cypriot differences limit discussions to the 
'Berlin Plus' operations. The EU and NATO have moved beyond the 'Berlin Plus' 
framework and are currently engaged side by side in a number of theatres around 
the world. Although informal and operational interactions provide for a certain 
degree of practical cooperation, the blockade of important decisions at the top 
impacts on every working level and renders day-to-day cooperation highly 
complicated.  
 
Five scenarios for the future development of EU-NATO relations were presented. The 
first scenario, 'back to the bosom of Uncle Sam', implies that the EU gives up its 
ambitions to become an international security actor and reverts to the old formula of 
relying on the US. In the second scenario, 'twin-headed-eagle', the EU and NATO 
would share the same command structure and capabilities. Third, a 'two-pillar NATO' 
would be a re-balanced Alliance based on the US on one hand, and on an EU 
caucus on the other. Fourth, the 'dinner and the dishes' scenario refers to a 
transatlantic division of labor, according to which NATO is responsible for 'hard' 
security tasks, while the EU takes over 'soft' security issues. Finally, the EU could go 
'back to the future' and use NATO as a framework to develop a truly capable and 
independent CSDP.  
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Based on the criteria of acceptability, realizability and sustainability, the three first 
scenarios could be ruled out. The most desirable would probably be the 'back to the 
future' scenario. Since the US and NATO are asking for a stronger and more capable 
CSDP, this option would currently also be the most acceptable of the five scenarios. 
H o w e v e r ,  t h e  E U  w o u l d  h a v e  t o  l i v e  u p  t o  t h e  a m b i t i o n s  s t a t e d  i n  t h e  E S S  a n d  
become "more active, more coherent and more capable".96  
 
While the EU might achieve these goals in the long term, we are more likely to see a 
division of labor in the foreseeable future. Formally speaking, there will be no soft-
hard division of labor as depicted in 'the dinner and the dishes' scenario. A fixed 
division of labor would limit both the CSDP and NATO in their further development. 
Instead, we might see a flexible and ad hoc division of labor. Depending on the 
threat scenario, political priorities and capabilities, one or the other organization, or 
both, will intervene.  
 
Despite favorable political constellations as well as the 'wind of change' following the 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the Alliance's New Strategic Concept, there will 
be no immediate solution to the 'frozen conflict'. Rather than renewing the whole 
picture, the EU and NATO will have to be pragmatic and try to connect pieces of the 
puzzle. Several steps could be taken: 
 
(1) Increased Political Consultation 
At the political level, there should be more informal channels and meeting points in 
order to discuss topics of mutual concern. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer proposed:  
monthly NAC-PSC meetings on pre-agreed topics, informal bi-monthly transatlantic 
lunches or dinners at Ambassadorial level, or regular visits to NATO by senior EU 
officials involved in issues of common concern, and vice-versa.97 
 
In such venues, the transatlantic partners could exchange ideas throughout the 
whole crisis management process. When faced with a common security challenge, 
they could discuss the most suitable framework of engagement. In case of parallel 
engagement, they could delineate tasks and jointly identify operational problems 
and solutions. In the aftermath of parallel engagement, they could exchange their 
                                                 
96 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe, op. cit., p. 11.  
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views on 'lessons learned'. Even if no formal decisions can be taken, such discussions 
could foster a common strategic vision that might translate into the respective 
structures. The bandwidth of informal political discussions will, however, depend on 
Turkish and Cypriot levels of tolerance.  
 
(2) Cross-Representation and Liaison 
There should be more cross-representation and liaison at the strategic-military and 
operational levels.98 Since NATO wants to pursue a comprehensive approach it is 
interested to obtain deeper insights into the EU's civilian planning structures.99 
Increased and broadened cross-representation and liaison could ensure that civilian 
viewpoints are taken into account in NATO's planning processes. This would 
ultimately facilitate civil-military coordination at the operational level. The Civil-
Military Planning Directorate, the EU's new civil-military planning body, could become 
a platform for increased cooperation.100  
 
(3) EU-NATO Cooperation Agreement 
Civil-military cooperation in planning should be lifted to another level through an EU-
NATO cooperation agreement.101 Such an agreement would provide for "full 
involvement of the EU in planning for scenarios in which NATO would lead a military 
operation and the EU would lead a concurrent civilian deployment".102 Sven Biscop 
believes that, unlike a 'Berlin Plus Reverse', such a cooperation agreement would be 
politically feasible.103  
 
(4) Capability Development 
The EU and NATO have similar capability gaps. Considering the growing budgetary 
restraints in most of the organizations' member states, resources must be pooled. In 
order to prevent duplication and to create synergies, there should be more 
exchange between capabilities experts in the EDA and the Allied Command 
Transformation with the goal to establish a number of joint EU-NATO capability 
projects.  
                                                 
98 Ibid. 
99 The Report of the Group of Experts even recommended setting up a small civilian planning 
unit within NATO. NATO, NATO 2020, op. cit., p. 42. 
100 Interview with LtCol Kennedy, op. cit.  
101 Interview with S. Biscop, op. cit. 
102 S. Biscop, "Preparing for the NATO Summit: From Allies to Partners", Atlantic Council of the 
United States, 2 February 2009.  
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In order to improve cooperation in crisis management, the EU and NATO will have to 
follow a 'gradualistic policy'. Whether this will, in the end, resolve the so-called 'frozen 
conflict' remains to be seen. In the meantime, pragmatic and informal ways of 
cooperation will enable both organizations to enhance their contribution to the 
comprehensive approach. If the two most important security actors of the Western 
hemisphere fail in their attempts to project 'comprehensive power', they will both lose 
their credibility. Enhanced cooperation will enable both organizations to attain their 
security objectives, while the existing obstacles diminish the power of both actors. Or 
as Keohane put it, "NATO and the EU will sink or swim together".104 The two 
organizations are condemned to close cooperation and should work towards 
transforming this cooperation into the "truly comprehensive partnership"105 they 
continuously announce. 
                                                 
104 Keohane, op. cit., p. 7. 
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